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1. Introduction 
A review of the financial literature reveals numerous attempts to quantify and explain risk- 
taking behaviour of financial intermediaries. This topic is central in economics and finance 
since controlling the risk-taking in banking relates directly to the protection both of 
depositors and the financial system as a whole. Moreover, there is a clear conflict inside 
banks between the interests of shareholders and the interests of depositors. The former are 
willing to take higher levels of risk that increases the share value at the expense of the value 
of deposits.  
Although mechanisms such as flat rate deposit insurance are an effective device to 
avert bank runs, some authors, such as Merton (1977), claim that deposit insurance can 
generate problems of moral hazard in the behaviour of banks, raising the shareholders 
incentives to take risk above the optimal level. Kane (1988) and Barth (1991), among others, 
use this argument to explain the 1980's crisis in American thrift institutions, characterised by  
excessive risk-taking and high rate of failure. As well, banking risk-taking has been analysed 
in the US financial market from different viewpoints. Saunders et al. (1990), Chen et al. 
(1998), Gorton and Rosen (1995) or Anderson and Fraser (2000) analyse the link between 
managerial ownership and risk-taking. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) analyse the link between  
size and bank risk.  
Risk taking in the Spanish banking sector has been scarcely analysed, although the 
Spanish case is especially interesting. In the Spanish financial market there are two different 
forms of bank ownership and legal form competing for loans and deposits in the same 
market. In one hand, the Spanish Commercial banks (SCB) are privately owned banks being 
shareholder-oriented corporations. In the other hand, Spanish Savings banks (SSB) are 
commercial non-profit organizations where control is shared among multiple interest groups: 
local and regional governments, employees, depositors and their founding entities. In this 3 
sense, their ownership structure comes close to the shared ownership model (García-Cestona 
and Surroca, 2002) 
The SSB control about half of the Spanish banking market. They display several 
important features. First, the SSB earnings must be retained or must be invested in social and 
cultural activities (around 25% of net yearly profits). Second, they have no formal owners. 
Third, decision-making in SSB involves depositors, public authorities and employees, among 
others. For this reason, the range of objectives serves a variety of sometimes conflicting 
interests among stakeholders. Lastly, SSB are immune to market corporate control with the 
exception of friendly takeovers or mergers by other Saving banks. 
The disperse ownership structure of SSB would appear to give managers freedom of 
action, which induces Savings banks to undertake more risk. Furthermore, the presence of 
public authorities on their governing bodies will affect decision-making. For example, 
Spanish regional governments may have incentives to control the Savings banks in their 
regions to enhance the sustainability of certain adjustment policies. The influence of these 
regional governments may weigh too heavily in certain commercial decisions taken by 
Savings banks, and may lead to excessive risk-taking.  
Our paper analyses how these differences between Spanish Savings and Commercial 
banks translate into risk-taking behaviour. In this sense, this paper adds new evidence to the 
debate on patterns of risk behaviour among companies with different form of ownership and 
legal structure. We use the accounting model of bank risk proposed by Hannan and Hanweck 
(1988) and Boyd et al. (1993), that enables us to obtain an approximate measure of 
insolvency risk for each institution. 
This paper also analyses how risk-taking behaviour is affected by internal control 
mechanisms in the governance of financial institutions. Crespí et al. (2004) point out that 
internal control mechanisms works properly if the probability of a significant board turnover, 4 
including the replacement of the chairman or the general manager of the bank, increases with 
poor economic performance. Also, we expect that bank risk-taking can be reduced by the 
implementation of this type of corporate control. However, differences between Savings 
banks and Commercial banks mentioned before could lead a different impact of control 
mechanisms over risk patterns. Therefore, it is examined how risk-taking is affected by 
significant board turnover or the replacement of the general manager in the case of 
Commercial banks, and by the replacement only of the general manager in Savings banks. 
In addition, the paper focuses on the different size of the entities as a new source of 
different patterns in bank risk-taking. In particular, it is analysed whether differences in risk 
behaviour between Commercial banks and Savings banks are due more to size differences 
than to differences in their organizational form.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical 
framework. Section 3 describes the risk-taking model. Section 4 presents the data sample 
together with a preliminary descriptive analysis. Section 5 reports the results of the 
estimation and the tests of the hypotheses. Section 6 contains the main conclusions.  
 
2.  Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
2.1. The moral hazard  problem and owner-manager agency conflict 
  Risk-taking behaviour in financial institutions has been examined from different 
perspectives. The agency problem in financial institutions has been repeatedly addressed in 
the literature. A large part of this literature focuses on managerial behaviour in banking 
institutions (Saunders et al., 1990; Allen and Cebenoyan, 1991; Gorton and Rosen, 1995). 
Other studies examine different corporate control mechanisms (Prowse, 1995; Houston and 
James, 1995; Crawford et al., 1995; Crespí et al.,2004). However, the majority of these 5 
authors assume the moral hazard problem to affect financial institutions in the same way as 
any other kind of firm. 
  According to Ciancanelli and Reyes-Gonzalez (2000), the agency problem that arises 
in banks is more complex in nature. Regulation in this sector has far reaching effects because 
of the interdependence of monetary flows. Excessive risk-taking in an institution may result 
in bankruptcy, causing repercussions that are soon felt in the rest of the banking sector and, 
before long, in the economy as a whole. One of the commonest forms of intervention is 
deposit insurance. Caprio and Levine (2002) explain how deposit insurance reduces 
controlling incentives among depositors and debt-holders, who see that part of their capital is 
protected. This limited responsibility allows shareholders to retain as much profit as possible, 
while recouping part of their losses from the deposit insurance fund. This has a twofold 
effect. First, financial institutions are induced to take on more risk, thus increasing their 
amount of debt
1. The second effect reported by Caprio and Levine (2002) is that banks may 
become interested in finding a large number of small scale depositors, in order to spread debt 
rather than sharing it among just a few. In this way, while accepting some loss of efficiency, 
they escape the stricter control under which large scale depositors might place them.  
  This moral hazard problem has been thoroughly examined in US financial institutions, 
especially in an attempt to find an explanation for the 1980s Savings and Loan crisis in the 
U.S. (Gorton and Rosen ,1995; Kane, 1988; Barth, 1991 among others
2). The moral hazard 
can be mitigated in banks with high prospects of future gains. At high franchise value, bank 
owner interests and manager interests are most likely aligned, since both perceive high costs 
associated with financial distress because the franchise value  is not fully marketable. This 
phenomenon is common in all kinds of firms, but it is particularly serious in financial 
institutions, where loans are based on asymmetric information not easily transferable to third 6 
parties making the bankruptcy particularly costly (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Demsetz et 
al., 1997; Galloway et al., 1997). 
  Banking sector is also affected by the well known owner-manager agency conflict 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Cebenoyan et al. (1999) suggest that studies of this problem may 
result in different findings according to the approach used in each case. Thus, from the 
corporate control perspective, when control mechanisms are inadequate and information is 
asymmetric, managers will tend to take riskier decisions. Many authors agree, however, that 
owner-manager agency conflict may counteract the increase in risk-taking arising from the 
moral hazard problem. Managers can be reluctant to risk their wealth, their specific human 
capital or the associated advantages with controlling the firm. This risk aversion may lead 
them to choose safer investment projects or to operate with higher capital than owners would 
consider optimal. 
In other hand, the importance of the agency problem depends on the capability of the 
bank owners for monitoring management performance. If there is a sufficient concentration 
of outside ownership, the agency problem may be attenuated and the degree risk aversion in 
managers controlled. If capital is widely dispersed over a large number of shareholders, their 
individual incentive to control managers is reduced (the free rider problem). In this sense, 
ownership dispersion can increase the likelihood of opportunist managers behaviour. 
In short, shareholder control over directors has a two-way effect on risk. On the one 
hand, when such control exists, the owner-manager agency conflict disappears, while the 
moral hazard problem persists. In such cases, we might therefore expect to find higher levels 
of risk in financial institutions. With a low or non existent owners control degree moral 
hazard and agency conflicts co-exist. In such a case, the effect on risk-taking is less clear. 
First, the agency problem may increase risk, if, faced with the prospect of poor results, 
managers decide to risk over and above the optimal level and beyond shareholders' wishes. 7 
This would lead to greater risk than that resulting from the moral hazard problem alone. 
Lastly, if managers are more intent on retaining their own invested human capital and wealth, 
the moral hazard problem will reduce and there will be less risk taken than in the previous 
case. 
Some authors have pointed out the importance of governance mechanisms in banking 
sector and its different effect with respect to companies in other economic sectors (Prowse, 
1997; Adams and Mehran, 2003). Prowse (1997) examines relationship between the 
economic performance of US Bank Holdings Companies and the probability that a control 
mechanisms was activated. He analyses management turnover, hostile takeovers, friendly 
mergers and regulatory interventions. Prowse finds that these governance mechanisms are 
activates less frequently in the banking sector. Crespí, et al. (2004) examine the effectiveness 
of control mechanism in Spanish banking sector. They find that Spanish Saving banks shows 
weaker internal control mechanisms than Comercial banks.  
2.2. Spanish Commercial Banks versus Savings Banks 
In the Spanish banking sector there are several types of financial firms with different 
organizational forms and different ownership structures competing in the same market. 
Commercial banks are shareholder-oriented corporations while Spanish Savings banks are a 
mix between mutual companies and public institutions
3. That is, they have no capital and 
therefore no owners. Regulations, accounting practices, external reporting, etc. are practically 
the same for both types of banks. 
Savings banks have the ownership form of a private foundation, with a board of 
trustees with representatives from regional authorities, city halls, employees, depositors and 
the founding entity. In particular, according to García-Cestona and Surroca (2002) between 
the 15 and 45% of the members come from the Public Administration, between 20 and 45% 
from depositors, between o and 35% from the founding body and between the 5 and 15% 8 
from the workforce. This diversity of bodies intervening in the governance of SSB suggests 
that their managers have a broad freedom of action. In the case of Commercial banks, there is 
a higher likelihood that their managers are under shareholders control. From the property 
rights approach we can expect that SSB perform worse than SCB, but the empirical evidence 
shows that Spanish Savings and Commercial banks have similar levels of productive 
efficiency  (Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1997; Lozano, 1998). 
In respect to banking risk-taking, various empirical studies find that the organizational 
form of the financial institutions is directly related with their risk behaviour. (Verbrugge and 
Goldstein, 1981; Cordell et al., 1993; Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993; Esty, 1997). García-
Marco and Robles (2003) find significant differences in risk-taking behaviour related with 
ownership structure and size in a sample of Spanish financial entities.  
Under the moral-hazard point of view, as institutions with shareholders, Commercial 
banks might be expected to take greater risks than Savings banks, where there is no capital. 
However, in the case of SCB with a low degree of shareholder control, the outcome is less 
clear. In this case, the owner-manager agency conflict is likely to arise.  
Spanish large Commercial banks are listed in the stock market and their shares, 
although concentrated, are more dispersed among small shareholders than other financial 
firms. Some medium-sized banks are listed while others are not.  We assume, therefore, that 
in a Commercial banks, where there is a moral hazard problem affecting the bank risk-taking, 
greater shareholder concentration will mean greater risk-taking.  
Besides, the diversity of interests in Savings banks' governance structure may cause a 
dissimilar pattern of risk-taking. In particular, if any interest group within the board of SSB 
gains control over the institution, it will be able to tailor policy to suit its own interests, 
causing different patterns of risk behaviour among Savings banks. In this way, managers of 
SSB controlled by regional governments will encourage competition and contribute to 9 
regional development
4. However, the effect over risk of politicización of the decision making 
is not clearly defined (La Porta et al., 2002). In one hand, the interest of politicians in 
conserving the use of the savings banks like an instrument to reach political objectives can 
limit the risk-taking to guaranteeing the continuity of the organization. In the other hand, 
regional goverments can look for the accomplishment of politically desirable but 
nonprofitable projects and increase therefore the risk of the Savings bank.  
 
3·. A risk-taking model 
In order to identify the factors that lead to a financial institution being unable to pay 
its debts, we propose the following model: 
,, () ( ) Ownership Structure,CorporateControl Size Profitability,Typeof Business PE f π <− =   (1) 
where π are the total bank profits, P(.) indicates probability, and E is the equity capital. 
According to model (1) the likelihood of insolvency is a function of factors such as firm 
ownership structure, corporate control mechanisms, size of the corporation, profitability and 
the type of business. 
To assess the level of exposure to insolvency risk in financial institutions, we use the 
“Z-score”, proposed by Hannan and Hanweck (1988) or Boyd et al. (1993) and used by Nash 
and Sinkey (1997) and García-Marco and Robles (2003), among others.
5 This indicator 
considers risk of failure to depend fundamentally on the interaction of the income generating 
capacity, the potential magnitude of return shocks, and the level of capital reserves available 
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where ROAit is the return on assets of bank i in period t, Ei(.) indicates expected value, σi(.) 
indicates standard deviation and CAPit is the averaged ratio of equity capital to total assets for 
the entity i in period t. 
This indicator reveals the degree of exposure to operating losses, which reduce capital 
reserves that could be used to offset adverse shocks. Entities with low capital and a weak 
financial margin relative to the volatility of their returns will score high on this indicator. 
Since this indicator assigns great importance to the solvency and profitability record of 
financial institutions, it is a measure of their weakness or strength. 
Ownership structure is measured by means of three variables: Ownership, 
Concentration and Public Control. The first of them is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
1 for Commercial banks and zero for Savings banks. For Commercial banks, we also 
consider an indicator of shareholder concentration. We assume that Commercial banks with a 
high concentration, will be shareholder controlled, while in those where shareholders are 
more disperse, managers will be free to operate according to their own interests. If 
concentration has a positive effect on the likelihood of insolvency, there must be a moral 
hazard problem, because owners behave in a riskier fashion. In these circumstances, we 
might also expect Commercial banks to assume greater risks than Savings banks. 
To measure the degree of ownership concentration, we caluculate Herfindahl's index 








=∑  where wji is the proportion of stocks owned 
by shareholders in the j cathegory. We consider three cathegories: shareholders with less than 
100 shares, with less than 500 but more than 100 and shareholders with more than 500 shares 
(see Appendix 1 for calculation details). 
In the case of Savings banks, we are interested in analyse differences in risk patterns 
related with the control in the board of the regional governments. In order to analyse this , we 
construct a dummy variable, Public Control, that takes a value of 1 if the Savings bank is 11 
controlled by Regional Government and zero otherwise. We consider public control to be 
when the Regional Government together with the public founding bodies makes up more than 
50% of the General Assembly. 
As corporate control mechanism, we consider turnover in the governance structure. 
We use a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there is a change of Chairman and/or in 
the 50% or more of board members in Commercial banks. In the case of SSB, this variable is 
equal to 1 if there is a change of the General Manager of the Assembly. It is expectable that 
the turnover effects to be felt in the following period, rather than having a contemporaneous 
impact on risk-taking. If this mechanism is used to control the risk level of the bank, the 
effect of the turnover must be negative, but If it were due to poor profit, changing governing 
body may lead to higher risk-taking. 
Profitability is measured by ROE, defined as return on equity. We expect a positive 
relationship between risk and profitability, such that profit-maximising policies will be 
accompanied by higher levels of risk. For type of business we use the ratio Total Net Lending 
to Assets (TLA). We consider this kind of operation generally to involve a higher level of risk 
than other alternative forms of investment. 
  Finally, in expression (1), we consider size of entity to be another determinant of the 
likelihood of insolvency. Large banks are likely to be more expertiser in risk management 
than small institutions. Also, they have better diversification oportunities. However, as 
Demsetz and Strahan (1997) stress, certain activities and characteristic usually linked with 
large banking institutions may be inherenty risky. To measure size of entity we take the log 
of Total Assets and perform a cluster analysis to obtain the right number of different sizes. 
The procedure is described in the following section.  
 
 12 
4. Data and preliminary analysis 
The analysis is performed on data from a sample of financial institutions from 1993 to 
2000. 127 institutions make up the sample for 1993 and 129 for the remaining years of the 
study period, making a total of 1030 observations. Of the total number of firms, 50 are 
Savings banks and the rest are Commercial banks. We collect the data from Annual Balance 
Sheets and Profits and Losses Accounts. Data on Savings banks was taken from the Annual 
Statistics published by the Spanish Savings Banks Confederation. Data on Commercial banks 
was taken from the Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Bulletin of 
Statistics published by the Spanish Private Banking Association.  
The final years of the sample period were characterised by an intense period of   
mergers among Savings banks and mergers among Commercial banks. Since merged 
institutions can not be considered to have disappeared, we decide to retain them within the 
sample as individual entities
6. 
In order to characterise the financial institutions by size we now use Ward’s method 
to perform a cluster analysis on the natural logarithm of Total Assets for each year of the 
sample period. Results are reported in Table 1. In each case three clusters emerge, thus 
classifying the institutions into three groups: Small, Medium and Large.  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
The most numerous group overall is formed by medium sized institutions, followed 
by the small and then the large ones. The whole period is characterised by a process of 
growth leading to a marked increase in the number of medium sized institutions in 1997 and 
1998. The last two years are characterised by a decline in the number of small sized 
institutions and a sharp rise in the number of large ones which then become the most 
numerous group. 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 13 
In Figure 1, size is related to ownership structure. Most of the Commercial banks are 
in the small size category, while most of the Savings banks class as medium size. There is an 
overall decline in the number of small institutions throughout the period. A striking feature of 
the SSB is the process of growth that take them from the medium to the large size category 
along the sample period. Indeed, in 1999 and 2000 most of the Savings banks classed as 
large. This would suggest that the policies adopted by Savings banks were clearly aimed at 
achieving growth. Though an increase in the number of large SCB is also apparent in the last 
two years of the sample period, it is not as significant as in the case of the SSB. 
  The total number of observations is 630 for Commercial banks and 400 for Savings 
banks. While there were 14 large Commercial banks in 1993, by 2000 the number had more 
than doubled to 28. The SSB growth rate, which was stronger, took the number of large 
Savings banks from 10 in 1993 to 32 in 2000. 
[Insert table 2 around here] 
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the non-qualitative variables in model (1). It 
reveals much greater dispersion in Commercial banks on all the three variables. Variation 
Coefficient (Standard deviation/mean) for the Z-score in Commercial banks, for example, is 
seven times higher than in Savings banks (5.49 vs. 0.76), regardless of size. Indeed, it barely 
alters at all across different sizes of Savings bank. The maximum and minimum values of the 
three variables correspond to Commercial banks. There is also a greater asymmetry among 
SCB than among SSB. At first sight, there appear to be differences in the distribution of 
variables linked to their different ownership structure.When Z-score,  ROE and TLA are 
examined in relation to size and ownership structure some differences again emerge. Though 
there is no clear pattern, the medium size group appears more disperse.  
[Insert table 3 around here] 14 
In order to analyze statistical differences in Z-score distribution among entities, two 
non-parametric tests are performed: the Kruskall Wallis test for equality of medians and the 
Siegel Tukey test for equality of variances. As Table 3 shows, the results point to distinct 
differences in the insolvency risk indicator, associated not only with legal form but also with 
size. Equality of medians and variances is clearly rejected when comparisons are made 
between Savings banks and Commercial banks of any size category. Analysis reveals more 
diversity on the Z-score between different sized SCB than there is between different sized 
SSB, where equality of medians is rejected only between large and medium sized Savings 
banks and equality of variances only between medium sized and small Savings banks. 
 
5. Empirical findings  
  Before reporting the results of the estimation of model (1), the specification of the 
empirical model is given as follows: 
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where Z is the Z-score defined in expression (2); ROE is the return on equity, TLA is the 
Total Net Lending/Assets ratio;  CG is the dummy variable for changes in bodies of 
governance;  Ow represents Ownership, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for 
Commercial banks and 0 for Savings banks; Lg is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
for members of the cluster of large institutions and zero otherwise; and Me takes a value of 1 
for members of the cluster of medium sized institutions and zero otherwise. We also use as 
control variables are time dummies and Merger, M, which is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 for observations on merged institutions and 0 otherwise.  
Experssion (4) is a dynamic panel data model which is estimated in first differences in 
order to eliminate individual random effects, ηi. We use the Generalized Method of Moments 15 
(GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991, 1998). The instruments used are lagged 
values of the endogenous variable, Z-score, from t-3 to t-6, lagged values of the 
predetermined variable TLA from t-2 to t-6, the constant and time dummies. The results of the 
estimation are reported in Table 4 (Model A). 
The Sargan test statistic of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the validity of 
the instruments used. Self correlation tests reveal no first order or second order serial 
correlation. Results reveal high persistence on risk. Higher levels of ROE are accompanied by 
greater risk. Also, the greater the weight of Total Net Lending /Assets, the higher the level of 
risk taking. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Internal control mechanisms appear to work properly. Thus, turnover in governing 
bodies in Savings banks and Commercial banks is followed by a reduction in risk in the 
following period. Results appear to show SCB to be more risk-inclined than SSB. Large 
institutions also appear to assume greater risk, while no significant differences emerge 
between medium and small entities. 
In order to check for significant differences on the effect of explanatory variables 
related with ownership structure, we estimate a second model (Model B in Table 4) in which 
interactions between Ownership and the remaining explanatory variables are included. In this 
case, we also use as instruments the lagged values of the cross products of Z-score and TLA 
with Ownership. As can be seen in Table 4, first and second order self correlation tests and 
the Sargan test show the model to be valid.  
While results reveal significantly positive persistence in Commercial bank risk, the 
same effect is not significant in Savings banks. Major differences are also revealed in the 
impact of the remaining variables. Thus, increases in ROE have a significantly greater effect 16 
on the level of risk-taking behaviour in Commercial banks than in Savings banks. Indeed, the 
effect on Commercial banks is positive, whereas on Savings banks it is negative.  
The kind of business measured with TLA also seen to produce opposite effects. In 
Commercial banks, increases in this type of credit lead to increased risk, while in Savings 
banks their effect is negative. This result may be related to differences in the nature of 
business in each type of institution. In Savings banks, which are generally oriented towards 
small investors, an increase in this ratio is indicative of an increase in business volume, 
whereas in Commercial banks it may reflect a more aggressive strategy in the credit market. 
Further significant differences emerge in relation to institutional size. The level of risk 
is found to be lower in both large Savings banks and large Commercial banks, which suggest 
that they are better able to diversify than their smaller counterparts. Large Commercial banks 
are less risk-taking than large Savings banks. There are no appreciable size-related 
differences, however, between small and medium sized Savings banks or between small SCB 
and small SSB. It is worth noting that the level of risk in medium size Commercial banks is 
significantly higher than other institutions of any type or size.  
There are significant differences between Savings banks and Commercial banks in the 
effect of turnover among members of their governing bodies. In the case of Savings banks, 
turnover are followed by an increase in risk, while in Commercial banks, the opposite occurs. 
This may mean that turnover on the board works as a kind of corporate control mechanism in 
Commercial banks, while in Savings banks changes may be made to serve some other 
purpose.  
Following the same treatment as applied to ownership, we now propose to analyse the 
interactions between the various explanatory variables and institutional size (Model C in 
Table 4). In this case, we use the same intruments that in Model A ant lagged values of the 
cross products of Z-score size variables.
7. The results, show some degree of serial correlation 17 
of the first order but not of the second. Sargan test indicates the validity of the used 
instruments. 
Findings indicate a high persistence in insolvency risk for the larger institutions (large 
and medium sized), while this effect is non-significant in small ones. Although Return on 
Equity has a positive effect on risk in all types of institution, its impact is significantly greater 
in large ones. TLA is non-significant for small institutions and its effect is clearly negative for 
large and medium size ones. This suggest that increases in the proportion of credits granted 
by the largest institutions reduce their risk levels. Also, turnover of members of governing 
bodies has a negative effect on risk-taking in large and medium size institutions and a it is 
non-significant in small ones. This result indicates that internal control mechanisms work 
most effectively in large institutions.  
Summarizing, our findings point out clear evidence of major differences linked to 
legal form and size. However, it is important to determine whether control mechanisms 
specific to each type of ownership structure are effectively working to control the level of 
risk.  
5.1. The Commercial Banks Model 
In this seccion we analyze only the Comercial banks sample. Starting with equation 
(3), we include the explanatory variable Concentration measured by the Herfindahl Index 
desrived above. This new model is estimated with and without interactions with the size 
dummies.
8 
Instruments used for the estimation of the model (Table 5) are the same as in Model A 
(Table 4). In both cases, the Sargan test yields a very high p-value, and there is neither first 
order nor second order serial correlation.  
[Insert Table 5] 18 
The significant coefficients differ very little from those obtained in Model A. 
Focusing our attention on the variable Concentration, this have no significant effect on risk, 
which suggest that the degree of shareholder dispersion has no impact on the level of risk- 
taking.  
We also report in Table 5 the results of the multiplicative model. In this case, 
shareholder concentration is significant and it is possible to observe differences linked to 
Commercial banks size. Concentration has a negative effect in large and medium sized SCB, 
and a positive effect in small ones. The negative effect suggests that greater shareholder 
concentration in Commercial banks reduces risk-taking behaviour, and serves as a 
mechanism by which shareholders are able to control managers. Shareholders are apparently 
reluctant to take on excessive risk even when protected by deposit insurance, which was one 
of the hypotheses we aimed to test. The moral hazard problem is seen to exist only in 
smaller Commercial banks, where greater concentration is coupled with greater risk. 
However, our data indicates there is practically only one shareholder involved in the 
ownership structure in this case, which is the only one in which the moral hazard hypothesis 
holds. 
Another factor with a negative effect on risk-taking is change in governing bodies, 
which has a negative effect, regardless of size. This internal control mechanism appears to 
work, especially in the largest Commercial banks. Its influence is weakest in medium-size 
ones. 
5.2. The Savings Banks Model 
In this case, we analyze only the Saving banks sample. Now, we extend equation (3) 
to include the variable Public Control, as defined in section 3.
9 
Following the same procedure as with Commercial banks, we estimate the model with 
and without interactions between the explanatory variables and size. The results are reported 19 
in Table 6. Again, the Sargan test shows the instruments used in both models to be valid. 
Though there is some degree of first order serial correlation, this disappears in the model 
including interactions. There is no sign of second order serial correlation.  
[Insert Table 6] 
It is remarkable the sharp contrast between Savings banks and Commercial banks. 
This time, turnover among Savings banks board members appears to have no effect on risk-
taking. This shows that there are reasons other than risk control behind decisions to change 
Savings banks managers.  
Discrepancy in the sign of the effect of ROE and TLA is confirmed, since these two 
factors have a negative impact on risk-taking. The dummy size variables are non significant, 
indicating that there are no size-related differences in risk-taking in Savings sanks. 
Examination of the interactions reveals no differences in the determinants of risk-taking in 
different sizes of SSB except when it comes to the inertial effect of risk. This effect appears 
to be exclusive to medium-size Savings banks. 
Turning our attention to the variable Public Control, we find that it is not significant 
in either model (with or without interactions). Local and regional government control in 
Savings banks does not appear to affect their level of risk-taking, whatever their size.  
 
6. Conclusions 
  This paper examines risk behaviour in Spanish Commercial banks and Spanish 
Savings banks, two different types of financial institutions, each with its own legal 
configuration and ownership structure, but competing in the same market. Our results reveal 
major differences in the patterns and determinants of risk-taking behaviour, linked with both 
legal configuration and size. The major size-related differences that emerge among 20 
Commercial banks are not apparent among Savings banks, where risk behaviour appears to 
be more homogeneous.  
The moral hazard and agency problems in financial institutions have been thoroughly 
examined in the literature. Our findings show that Commercial banks, which are shareholder-
oriented corporations and therefore with clearly defined owners, exhibit a stronger tendency 
towards risk-taking than Savings banks, with their more diffuse ownership structure. 
  This supports the moral hazard hypothesis described in the literature, in the sense that, 
when able to rely on deposit insurance, the owners’ incentive to take risk increases. Higher 
shareholder concentration is implicitly linked to stricter shareholder control over managers. 
In this paper, however, it is found to be only in small Commercial banks that high ownership 
concentration leads to a greater increase in risk-taking, which appears to be clear evidence of 
the moral hazard problem in this kind of institution. In medium-size and large Commercial 
banks, however, the degree of concentration has the opposite effect; the greater the 
dispersion, the higher the level of risk-taking. This shows that Commercial bank managers in 
these size categories are more likely to increase risk when they are subject to less strict 
control, which may be an indication of possible owner-manager agency conflicts. 
The agency problem, which implies that less control will result in greater risk-taking, 
is also reflected in the result obtained from the analysis of the impact of turnover in 
governing bodies on risk-taking in the following period. In Commercial banks, turnover leads 
to a reduction in risk, which could mean that it works as a control mechanism. In Savings 
banks, however, the opposite effect is observed. This appears to suggest that in Savings banks 
such changes are made with a different purpose in mind. No evidence is found to suggest that 
local and regional government control over Savings banks has any effect on their degree of 
risk-taking. 21 
Finally, when institutional size is taken into consideration, turnover in governing 
bodies is seen to have a negative effect only in large and medium-sized Commercial banks, 
with no appreciable effect being found in small Commercial banks. This is probably an 
indication that the agency problem alluded to earlier tends to occur in the largest institutions, 
where corporate control mechanisms are most effective. 
 22 
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Table 1. Size distribution over total sample: Cluster Analysis 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  Total
Large  24 26 28 27 26 29 64 58  282 
  (18.9%) (20.2%) (21.7%) (20.9%) (20.2%) (22.5%) (49.6%) (45.0%)   
  {2.3%} {2.5%} {2.7%} {2.6%} {2.5%} {2.8%} {6.2%} {5.6%}   
Medium  69 49 50 50 75 68 34 46  441 
  (54.3%) (38.0%) (38.8%) (38.8%) (58.1%) (52.7%) (26.4%) (35.7%)   
  {6.7%} {4.8%} {4.9%} {4.9%} {7.3%} {6.6%} {3.3%} {4.5%}   
Small  34 54 51 52 28 32 31 25  307 
  (26.8%) (41.9%) (39.5%) (40.3%) (21.7%) (24.8%) (24.0%) (19.4%)   
  {3.3%} {5.2%} {5.0%} {5.0%} {2.7%} {3.1%} {3.0%} {2.4%}   
Total  127 129 129 129 129 129 129 129  1030 
  Centroids   
Large  14.524 14.506 14.536 14.639 14.738 14.805 13.983 14.271   
Medium  12.456 12.792 12.825 12.929 12.625 12.738 12.217 12.415   
Small  9.762 10.514  10.526  10.658 9.923  10.173 10.235 10.018   
 ( ) = percentage of total for the year, { } =  percentage of whole sample.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics by size and ownership structure 
   Mean  Median Std. Error Asymm. Kurtosis   J-B 
Large Institutions             
Z-score  0.037 0.007  0.064  3.896 24.639  6215.2* 
Commercial Banks  0.028 0.001  0.083  3.812 19.057  1935.2* 
Savings Banks  0.048 0.045  0.032  0.469 3.137 5.063* 
ROE  0.142 0.133  0.161  13.166 204.0  482655* 
CommercialBanks  0.130 0.117  0.221  9.884 112.7  76126.8* 
Savings Banks  0.147 0.150  0.039  -0.947 5.305  50.035* 
Total Net Lending / Assets  0.521 0.509  0.150  -0.109 3.969  11.591* 
CommercialBanks  0.475 0.440  0.195  0.022 3.359 0.801 
Savings Banks  0.557 0.548  0.100  0.205 2.339 3.399 
Medium size Institutions          
Z-score  0.037 0.005  0.154  13.624 215.6  844298* 
Commercial Banks  0.037 0.001  0.214  10.001 114.1  119480* 
Savings Banks  0.036 0.036  0.030  0.431 2.492 9.004* 
ROE  0.121 0.129  0.095  -0.002 9.716 828.9* 
Commercial Banks  0.079 0.085  0.094  -1.135 9.702 469.4* 
Savings Banks  0.164 0.154  0.065  1.759 10.030  556.1* 
Total Net Lending / Assets   0.512 0.535  0.187  -0.500 3.604  25.057* 
Commercial Banks  0.487 0.513  0.232  -0.224 2.490 4.321 
Savings Banks  0.537 0.543  0.104  -0.032 2.607 1.428 
Small Institutions          
Z-score  0.018 0.002  0.051  7.189 72.590  64591.5* 
Commercial Banks  0.014 0.001  0.052  7.896 78.090  63294.3* 
Savings Banks  0.042 0.047  0.031  -0.255 1.581 4.644 
ROE  0.050 0.071  0.447  -15.901  269.4  920672* 
Commercial Banks  0.037 0.054  0.488  -14.505  225.0  536664* 
Savings Banks  0.142 0.149  0.047  -1.564 6.308  42.321* 
Total Net Lending / Assets   0.391 0.409  0.275  0.171 2.031  13.508* 
Commercial Banks  0.357 0.330  0.279  0.462 2.259  15.023* 
Savings Banks  0.618 0.622  0.105  0.385 2.554 1.617 
Total Sample          
Z-score  0.031 0.002  0.110  16.517  358.831  5480750* 
Commercial Banks  0.025 0.001  0.138  13.762  238.394  1474404* 
Savings Banks  0.041 0.041  0.031  0.377 2.687  11.096* 
ROE  0.106 0.122  0.268  -21.633  645.821  17814281*
Commercial Banks  0.074 0.085  0.336  -17.694  421.152  4622715* 
Savings Banks  0.156 0.151  0.056  1.476 11.864  1454.974* 
Total Net Lending / Assets   0.478 0.505  0.217  -0.416 2.970  29.706* 
Commercial Banks  0.431 0.438  0.252  0.024 2.310  12.551* 
Savings Banks  0.554 0.555  0.106  0.109 2.720 2.103 
Sample includes 1030 observations: 282 corresponding to large institutions (147 Commercial banks and 135
Savings banks), 441 to medium sized inst. (225 Commercial banks and 216 Savings banks) and 307 to small
inst. (258 Commercial banks and 49 Savings banks). Number of institutions in sample: 79 Commercial 
banks (77 in 1993) and 50 Savings banks each year. J-B is the Jarque-Bera Normality Test. * indicates 
rejection of the null hypothesis of normality at the 1% significance level. 
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Table 3. Z-score: tests of equality of medians and variances  







Total sample        
Equality of medians     5.079** 3.659* 11.913*** 
   (0.024) (0.056)  (0.001) 
Equality of variances    0.534 6.920***  5.452*** 
   (0.593) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Commercial Banks        
Equality of medians     0.028 3.084* 5.264** 
   (0.867) (0.079)  (0.022) 
Equality of variances    2.723*** 5.482***  1.998** 
   (0.007) (0.000)  (0.046) 
Savings Banks        
Equality of medians     10.382*** 2.197 0.278 
   (0.001) (0.138)  (0.598) 
Equality of variances    0.667 1.913*  1.509 
   (0.505) (0.056)  (0.131) 
Commercial Banks vs Savings Bank Total  Large Medium  Small 
Equality of medians   176.597*** 73.536*** 66.389*** 21.349*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Equality of variances  10.370*** 0.598  5.177***  7.137*** 
  (0.000) (0.550)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
The null hypothesis of equality of medians is tested with the Kruskal-Wallis test and the equality of 
variances with the Siegel-Tukey test. Between parentheses the p-value. *, ** and *** indicate 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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Table 4. Determinants of insolvency risk 
  Model A Model  B Model  C 
  Coeff.  P-value Coeffi.  P-value Coeff.  P-value
Constant  -0.018 (0.148)  0.030*  (0.001)  -0.016*  (0.000) 
Z-score(t-1)   1.030*  (0.000) 0.082 (0.403)  -0.013  (0.228) 
x Ownership     1.065*  (0.000)     
x Large size        1.081*  (0.000) 
x Medium size         1.399*  (0.000) 
ROE  0.417* (0.000)  -0.043*  (0.004)  0.170*  (0.000) 
x Ownership     0.432*  (0.000)    
x Large size        0.152*  (0.000) 
x Medium size         0.102*  (0.000) 
Total Net Lending / Assets  0.012 (0.841) -0.353*  (0.000)  0.003  (0.782) 
x Ownership     0.456*  (0.000)    
x Large size        -0.031*  (0.000) 
x Medium size         -0.033*  (0.000) 
Turnover Governing bodies (t-1)  -0.095* (0.000)  0.009*  (0.000)  0.002  (0.497) 
x Ownership     -0.079*  (0.000)    
x Large size        -0.060*  (0.000) 
x Medium size         -0.031*  (0.000) 
Merger  -0.185* (0.000)  0.003  (0.787)  -0.021*  (0.001) 
Ownership  0.044* (0.000)  0.011  (0.383)  0.021*  (0.000) 
Large size  0.060* (0.000) -0.025**  (0.032)  0.027*  (0.000) 
x Ownership     -0.029**  (0.043)    
Medium size  0.006 (0.598)  0.011  (0.282) 0.033*  (0.000) 
x Ownership     0.034**  (0.012)    
Time Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes 
First-order serial correlation  -0.604  (0.546) -1.238 (0.216)  -1.776  (0.076) 
Second-order serial correlation  1.230  (0.219) 0.318 (0.751)  0.136  (0.892) 
Wald joint significance (df=8,14,16) 3581.27 (0.000) 83512.61 (0.000)  16340333  (0.000) 
Wald time dummies (df=6)  31.088 (0.000) 328.995 (0.000)  1727.178  (0.000) 
Sargan Test (df=28, 58, 50)  21.463 (0.806)  55.937  (0.552) 56.473  (0.246) 
The dependent variable is the Z-score. The models were estimated by GMM, in first differences, with the
Arellano and Bond (1998) New DPD package, using the Two Step Estimator that is robust to heteroskedasticity. 
Shown in parentheses the p-valor. ***, ** and * indicate parameter significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels respectively. The time dummies included are significant in all cases. We test joint
significance of the explanatory variables (Wald joint significance) and joint significance of the time dummies
(Wald time dummies), df indicates degrees of freedom in test. The estimated models are: 
Model A:   
01 12 3 4 15 6 7 8 it it it it it it it it it i it Z Z ROE TLA CG Ow Lg Me M β ββ β β β βββ η ε −− =+ + + + + + + + + +  
Model B: 
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Table 5. Determinants of insolvency risk: Commercial Banks 
  Without interactions  With interactions 
  Coeff. T-ratio P-Value Coeff. T-ratio P-Value
Constant  0.027* 2.876 (0.004) -0.075* -7.091 (0.000) 
Z-score(t-1)   1.085* 33.293 (0.000)  -0.068* -13.818 (0.000) 
x Large size       0.785* 463.254  (0.000) 
x Medium size        1.454* 436.747  (0.000) 
ROE   0.219* 3.140 (0.002) 0.234* 87.176  (0.000) 
x Large size       -0.188* -29.104 (0.000) 
x.Medium size        -0.042* -13.948 (0.000) 
Total Net Lending / Assets  0.087** 2.424 (0.015) 0.062* 12.848  (0.000) 
x Large size       0.054* 15.189  (0.000) 
x Medium size        -0.007** -2.464 (0.014) 
Turnover in Governing bodies (t-1)  -0.077* -10.698 (0.000)  -0.026* -12.641 (0.000) 
x Large size       -0.030* -12.197 (0.000) 
x Medium size        0.007* 2.907  (0.004) 
Concentration  0.081 1.173 (0.241) 0.080* 7.121  (0.000) 
x Large size       -0.184* -13.451 (0.000) 
x Medium size        -0.393* -25.225 (0.000) 
Merger  -0.093** -2.163 (0.031) -0.023* -11.151 (0.000) 
Large size  -0.039* -3.272  (0.001)  0.177* 13.885  (0.000) 
Medium size  0.064* 5.089 (0.000) 0.402* 26.208  (0.000) 
Time dummies  Yes   Yes 
First-order serial correlation  -0.452 (0.651)    -0.782 (0.435) 
Second-order serial correlation  0.912 (0.362)    0.208 (0.835) 
Wald joint significance (df=8)  12085.7 (0.000) (df=18) 226373416.3 (0.000) 
Wald time dummies  (df=6)  102.078 (0.000)  (df=6) 10937.914  (0.000) 
Sargan Test  (df=28)  21.549 (0.802)  (df=48)  53.701  (0.265) 
See the end note of table 4. The estimated models are: 
1. Without interactions 
01 12 3 4 1
56 78 9
it it it it it
it it it it i it it
ZZ R O E T L A C G
Ow Lg Me M C
β ββ β β
β βββ η β ε
−− =+ + + + +
++++ + + +
 
2. With interactions 
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Table 6. Determinants of insolvency risk: Savings Banks 
  Without interactions  With interactions 
  Coeff. T-ratio P-Value Coeff. T-ratio  P-Value
Constant  0.041* 17.463 (0.000)  0.060* 5.051  (0.000) 
Z-score(t-1)   0.554* 17.078 (0.000)  0.177 0.812  (0.417) 
x Large size      0.338 1.432  (0.152) 
x Medium size       0.518** 2.266 (0.023) 
ROE   -0.107* -20.842 (0.000)  -0.007 -0.045  (0.964) 
x Large size      -0.018 -0.105  (0.916) 
x Medium size       -0.168 -0.984  (0.325) 
Total Net Lending /Assets  -0.067* -3.538 (0.000) -0.176** -2.444 (0.015) 
x Large size      -0.052 -1.287  (0.198) 
x Medium size       0.012 0.325  (0.745) 
Turnover on Governing Bodies (t-1)  -0.002 -0.888 (0.374)  0.076 0.991  (0.322) 
x Large size      -0.082 -1.050  (0.294) 
x Medium size       -0.093 -1.190  (0.234) 
Public Control   0.001 0.799  (0.424) -0.035 -1.430  (0.153) 
x Large size      0.038 1.467  (0.142) 
x Medium size       0.032 1.473  (0.141) 
Merger  0.015* 2.565 (0.010)  0.029** 2.224 (0.026) 
Large size  -0.004 -1.393 (0.164) -0.024 -1.628  (0.104) 
Medium size  -0.001 -0.227 (0.821) -0.016 -1.143  (0.253) 
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes 
First-order serial correlation  -1.707 (0.088)    -0.175 (0.861) 
Second-order serial correlation  -0.700 (0.484)   0.678  (0.498) 
Wald joint significance (df=8)  4306.27 (0.000) (df=18)  640.92 (0.000) 
Wald time dummies  (df=6)  1140.07 (0.000) (df=6)  330.49 (0.000) 
Sargan Test  (df=28)  34.330 (0.190)  (df=18)  18.155 (0.446) 
See the end note of table 5. The estimated models are: 
1. Without interactions 
01 12 3 4 1
56 78 9
it it it it it
it it it it i it it
ZZ R O E T L A C G
Ow Lg Me M P
β ββ β β
β βββ η β ε
−− =+ + + + +
++++ + + +
 
2. With interactions 
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To measure the degree of ownership concentration in the case of SCB, we caluculate 
Herfindahl's index for their shareholder distribution. We have data for the total numbers of 
shares and shareholders for each Commercial bank. Specifically, we have the number of 
shareholders in the following categories: 
T1. Those with 100 shares and less 
T2. Those with 100 to 500 shares 
T3. Those with 500 shares and over 
If we use s1it and s2it to denote the numbers of shareholders in Commercial bank i, in 
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where we have assumed the average number of shares owned by shareholders in categories 




1 This risk-seeking behaviour on the part of owners is a symptom of the moral hazard 
problem identified by Merton (1977). 
2 See also Akerlof and Romer (1993) who analyse the behaviour of American Savings Banks 
during the eighties. According to these authors, inadequate accountancy rules and lax 
regulation encouraged insider stockholders to "loot" deposit insurance funds. 
3  There is a third type of bank: Credit cooperatives but they only control less than the 5% of 
the loan and deposit markets.  
4 There are many examples, such as the entry of Castilla León Savings bank to Spain's largest 
sugar company, by Regional Government order; or the purchase by some Andalusian 
Savings banks of a portfolio of shares in the Seville Electricity Company, without this 
giving them any right of control in the company. 
5 It would be useful to examine other measures of bank risk-taking, such as market risk or 
systematic risk but only large Commercial banks in our sample are listed in the Spanish 
Stock Market.  
6 Given that the variables for the model are ratios, merged institutions are assigned the same 
ratio value from the date of the merger. 
7  We do not include the instruments of the predetermined variable multiplied by the size 
dummies because computational considerations prevent invert the instrument matrix. 
8 Around 90% of small Commercial banks score above 0.9 on the Concentration Index. In the 
medium size category, shareholder concentration increased gradually throughout the sample 
period. Most of the institutions with the highest dispersion are large Commercial banks. 
9 The total number of publicly controlled Savings banks was 20 in 1993. The last two years 35 
 
show a sharp rise in the public control of Savings banks in our sample but until 1997 the 
majority of large Savings banks were not publicly controlled.  